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ABSTRACT
Two types of currency crisis models coexist in the literature: first generation models
view speculative attacks as being caused by economic fundamentals which are
inconsistent with a given parity. Second generation models claim self-fulfilling
speculation as the main source of a currency crisis. Recent empirical research in
international macroeconomics has attempted to distinguish between the sources of
currency crises. This paper adds to this literature by proposing a new empirical
approach to identifying the speculative and fundamental components of currency
crises in the context of a structural vector autoregression model. Our results suggest
that only for the French franc can a substantial speculative component be identified
as a potential source of the 1992-93 ERM crisis.
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1.  Introduction
In their survey of the literature Agenor, Bhandari and Flood (1992), Obstfeld
(1995, 1996) and Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995a, 1995b) point out that the
two generations of speculative attack models co-exist in the literature: the first
generation of such models is based on theoretical work by Krugman (1979), Flood
and Garber (1984a) and Obstfeld (1984), and these models have been generalized in
various directions by Willman (1988), Wyplosz (1989), Gros (1992), and Goldberg
(1994), amongst others. Second generation models of currency crisis originate in
the work of Flood and Garber (1984b) and Obstfeld (1986), with more recent
extensions in Claessens (1991), Dellas and Stockman (1992), Ozkan and Sutherland
(1994), Obstfeld (1994, 1996), Bensaid and Jeanne (1994), and Flood and Marion
(1996), amongst others. First generation models of currency crisis predict co-
movements between speculative attacks and adverse developments in the
fundamental determinants of exchange rates, such as differential movements of
money growth rates, price or wage inflation rates, real output growth rates, budget
or trade deficits, to mention but a few possible fundamentals. Diverging
fundamentals are viewed as being inconsistent with a given parity; fundamental
economic imbalances indicate a lack of central bank commitment to the parity; they
are interpreted by market participants as a signal that a realignment will occur
sooner or later. The ability of a central bank to postpone realignments typically
depends on the volume of their foreign exchange reserves. In most models
expectations of a change in the exchange rate emerge as soon as these reserves have
fallen below a critical threshold. Such realignment expectations are reflected by
increasing risk premia and rising interest rate differentials during the attack. Note
that in these first generation speculative attack models only tight international
policy co-ordination aimed at keeping fundamentals closely in line can ultimately
avoid a currency crisis. In second generation models this remedy is useless, because
these models predict that self-propagating and potentially self-fulfilling speculative-    - 2
attacks may occur out of the blue, even if fundamentals are consistent with the
indefinite maintenance of a given fixed parity. Recent theoretical research has
stressed that self-fulfilling speculative attacks may have contagious effects on other
currencies. For the precise modelling of these international spillovers see Gerlach
and Smeets (1994), Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti (1995, 1996) or Eichengreen, Rose
and Wyplosz (1995c).
Given these alternative views, which is the empirically more relevant model?
The answer to this question solely depends on whether or not empirically a currency
crisis must be viewed as being justified by fundamental imbalances or as being
purely speculative. Systematic empirical research on these issues is only just
emerging, and the evidence is mixed. By using event studies Eichengreen, Rose and
Wyplosz (1995a, 1995b) and Kaminsky (1996) show that currency crises are
frequently preceded by fundamental macroeconomic imbalances and early warning
signs. Jeanne (1995) and Jeanne and Masson (1996), on the other hand, demonstrate
empirically that the French franc crisis of 1992-93 had strong self-fulfilling
characteristics. Flood and Marion (1996) also try to distinguish between
fundamental and speculative components of a currency crisis by analysing data
from the Mexican peso crisis of 1992-94.
The present paper extends the empirical literature by proposing a new
empirical approach to identifying the speculative and fundamental components of a
currency crisis in the context of a structural vector autoregression model. To get to
grips with this issue, we develop a theoretical model in which the exchange rate is
driven by various fundamental factors, but also has a speculative component. We
will focus on both monetary and real fundamentals: on the real side of the economy
we allow for differential behaviour of real wages, real interest rates, employment
and output between the two countries under study. On the monetary side we focus
on differential movements of nominal interest rates, money, prices and wages. We
view these variables as being jointly driven by five distinctive fundamental-    - 3
disturbances: labour supply and productivity shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and
financial shocks, such as money supply and money demand (velocity) shocks. We
also include a speculative shock in our model by allowing for time-varying risk
premia. We will derive the reduced form rational expectations solution of the model
under both fully flexible prices (long-run solution) and under sluggish price
adjustment (short-run solution). Based on these alternative solutions we will try to
pin down theoretically the effects of the various shocks on the nominal exchange
rate and the other variables in our model, and we will attempt to empirically
estimate the relative contribution of each of these shocks to nominal exchange rate
movements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 outlines our
theoretical model and derives the rational expectations reduced forms for the short-
run under sluggish price adjustment and for the long-run under flexible prices. Our
approach to identification is described in section 3, and section 4 presents our
empirical results for the United States and some European economies. Section 5
concludes.
2.  A model of exchange rates, fundamentals and speculation
Our basic model is an extended version of the stochastic two-country rational
expectations open economy macro model developed by Obstfeld (1985) and Clarida
and Galí (1994), as presented in Weber (1997). In the analysis below we focus
primarily on the long-run properties of the model, which displays many of the long-
run neutrality properties that typically characterize macroeconomic equilibrium in a
neoclassical framework. Following the usual tradition all variables except interest
rates are in logarithms and represent home relative to foreign levels. For example,
y y y t t
h
t
f ” -  represents the logarithm of the output ratio home (yt
h) and abroad (yt
f ).-    - 4
The goods market is characterized by a standard output demand function
which displays the real exchange rate (q s p t t t = - ), the real interest rate differential
( ) ( ) i E p p t t t t - - +1  and the relative real wage rate (w p t t - ) as its main arguments:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) y s p i E p p w p d t
d
t t t t t t t t t = - - - - + - + + h s f 1 , (1)
where dt is a relative demand shock. Contrary to Clarida and Galí (1994), we only
allow for a permanent component (e
d
t ) of the relative demand shock. In particular,
we suppose that the shock to relative demand in period t is given by:




t  is normally independently distributed (n.i.d.) with zero mean and constant finite
variance.
The basic structure of the supply side of the simple open economy macro
model follows Shapiro and Watson (1988) in assuming that firms in the long-run
produce consumer goods with a Cobb-Douglas technology:
y 1 t
s
t t t = + + - A l k a a ( ) , (3)
where kt is the log level of the capital stock, lt  is the log level of the labour input,
and At  is the log level of technology. In order to avoid having to incorporate the
capital stock into our model we adopt the assumption that the long-run steady state
capital-output ratio is constant:
kt = + yt k, (4)
and given by a value of k. Substituting (4) into (3) and rearranging yields the long-





( ) 1 1 a k
a a
A l t t, (5)-    - 5
whereby the constant ((1-a)k/a) will be suppressed below. To capture the dynamics
of technology we introduce a stochastic forcing process, which reflects the impact
of permanent stochastic production technology innovations (et
z):
A A t t-1 = +et
z, (6)
whereby the technology shocks (et
z) are assumed to be normally independently
distributed with zero mean and constant finite variance.
The demand for labour in each country depends on relative factor costs for
labour and is a negative function of the real wage rate. As a result, home relative to
foreign labour demand is given by:
( ) l ß w p t
d
t t = - - , (7)
and is decreasing in the real wage differential. Labour supply, on the other hand is a
positive function of the real interest rate differential and the real wage differential:
( ) ( ) ( ) l i E p p w p t
s
t t t t t t t = - - + - + + j g w 1 , (8)
where w t represents the stochastic component of the evolution of the labour supply





t t-1 = + t , (9)
with the labour supply shocks (e
w
t ) being assumed to be normally independently
distributed with zero mean and constant finite variance.
To introduce some nominal rigidities into the model we adopt a version of the
price setting equation that has been studied in open economy macro models by
Flood (1981), Mussa (1982), Clarida and Gali (1994), and others:




According to this price setting rule the price level in period t is a weighted average
of the market clearing price expected in period t-1 to prevail in period t, Et-1 pt
e, and-    - 6
the price that would actually clear the output market in period t, pt
e. When q =1,
prices are fully flexible and output is supply determined. When q = 0 prices are
fixed and predetermined one period in advance.
The money market of the simple open economy rational expectations model is
described by a standard demand for money function which features relative incomes
(yt ) and the nominal interest rate differential (it ) as its main arguments. We relate
the inverse of the relative income velocity of money to movements in the interest
rate differential and asymmetric velocity shocks:
( ) m p y i d t
d
t t t t
m
t - - = - + - l e , (11)
where e t
m
t d -  is the inverse of the relative velocity shock which has a relative
demand shock component dt  and a relative money demand shock component et
m,
which both are normally independently distributed with zero mean and constant
finite variance. Nominal interest rates are assumed to be determined by the
uncovered interest rate parity condition:
( ) i E t t = - + + s s t t t 1 y , (12)
where y t  represents a time-varying risk premium. Such risk premia reflect the fact
that domestic and foreign bonds may not be perfect substitutes: in order to induce
domestic agents to hold the more risky foreign bonds they have to be granted such
risk premia. As pointed by Engel (1996), there is substantial empirical evidence that
risk premia have a unit-root. Taking this into account, we model the risk premium





t t t = + -1 , (13)-    - 7
where e
y
t  is normally independently distributed with zero mean and constant finite
variance. We view this speculative component of the risk premium as the major
source of a potential non-stationarity in nominal interest rate differentials.1 2
Note that inserting (12) into (11), using the definition of the real exchange
rate, and solving for the nominal exchange rate yields:






= + - + - + - + +
-
e l y
1 2 444 4 3 4444 1 2 44 4 3 444
Et 1 .
This equation is at the heart of most models of currency crisis, and it is the forward
looking component through which devaluation expectations or speculative bubbles
influence the current exchange rate. To model these forward looking rational
exchange rate expectations we need to specify the monetary policy reaction
function.
We close the model by specifying the relative money supplies, which we take
as being determined by two important aspects of central banking. On the one hand,
central banks are assumed to target a constant money growth rate, which for
simplicity is set to be equal in both countries. Whilst the deterministic component of
money growth differentials is assumed to be zero, the evolution of the relative
money supplies may be captured by a simple stochastic trend. However, European
central banks also operate under an exchange rate constraint. In our model this
implies that within certain limits they have to stabilize exchange rate movements
caused by both fundamental and speculative shocks. To capture both aspects of
central banking we employ the money supply equation:
                                               
1 Near unit roots in nominal interest rate differentals are frequently found in the data. See Rose and
Svensson (1994) for references to this stylized fact for ERM countries. These authors furthermore show
that under pegged exchange rates expected realignment rates account for a substantial component of
nominal interest rate differentials. We identify expected realignments with the non-stationary
component of interest rate differentials, whilst their stationary stochastic component is due to transitory
exchange rate fluctuations as a result of money demand shocks, as will be shown below.
2 Note that our identification strategy would still go through if we were to model speculative shocks as
being a stationary stochastic process or a mean-reverting process. However, the resulting analytical
solutions would look slightly more complicated.-    - 8
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t  as a relative money supply shock, which again is assumed to be normally
independently distributed with zero mean and constant finite variance. This general
specification allows the central bank to conduct its monetary policy under an
exchange rate constraint by "leaning-against-the-wind" and using sterilized or non-
sterilized intervention. Note that the above feedback-rule, in which the central bank
responds to contemporaneous shocks in order to stabilize nominal exchange rates
(or prices), will only qualitatively alter the behaviour of prices and exchange rates.
For example, central banks may choose the feedback coefficients (g) such as to
eliminate the effects of a particular shock, say the speculative shock, on the nominal
exchange rate. This would imply certain symmetry restrictions for the effects of this
shock on real exchange rates and relative prices.3 But since we want to estimate the
contribution of the various shocks to exchange rate movements we prefer not to
impose any identifying restrictions on nominal exchange rates or relative prices. To
economize on notation we will therefore use equation (14) with all g-coefficients set
equal to zero, but we will return to the sensitivity of our identification strategy with
respect to the choice of the g-coefficients when discussing the empirical results.
2.1  Solving the model
To solve the model, we begin with deriving an expression for the real interest
rate differential that would prevail in the flexible-price rational expectations
equilibrium, r t
e. This can be shown to be the sum of the risk premium  y t  and the
transitory component of real exchange rate movements, which is zero:
rt
e = + - y e
y
t t 1 . (15)
                                               
3 The objective of our approach is to achieve just-identification of all shocks with our theoretical model.
However, such symmetry restrictions may be tested for in our model in the form of overidentifying
restriction tests. See Galí (1992) for details.-    - 9
The flexible price solution for the relative employment levels may be derived by
substituting the equilibrium real wage rate and real interest rate together with the
laws of motion for w t and  y t  into (7) to obtain:











+ - - t t t t 1 1 , (16)
and the solution for the output ratio is obtained by inserting (6) and (16) into (5):
( ) ( ) ( ) y = t
e At t
z



















y w . (17)
Note that in the long-run both employment and output are independent of aggregate
demand shocks and nominal shocks such as money supply or money demand
shocks.
Substituting the equilibrium real wage and real interest rate ratios together
with the laws of motion for At , dt ,  y t  and w t into (1), solving for qt
e, and carrying
out the conditional expectation projections results in:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )



































d y w . (18)
The flexible-price real exchange rate depreciates in response to relative technology
shocks, relative labour supply shocks and changes in the risk premium, and it
appreciates in response to a relative demand disturbance.
To derive an expression for the relative price level pt
e in the flexible-price
rational expectations equilibrium we solve (11) for pt
e, and using (12) to (14) we
obtain:
( ) ( ) ( )





















































(19)-    - 10
All six shocks influence the relative price level in the flexible-price solution: the
relative price level rises equiproportionally to the relative money supply shocks and
falls in response to relative money demand shocks. Relative prices also decline as a
result of a relative supply shock (technology shocks or labour supply shocks), and
they rise in response to relative demand shock. Without an order condition (i.e.
( ) l jb b g > + ) the effect of an increases in the risk premium on the price level
ratio is uncertain.
Comparing (16) and (17) yields an equation for the nominal exchange rate:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )





































































In the flexible-price solution both money supply shocks and money demand shocks
have an identical impact on the price ratio and the nominal exchange rate. Also
notice that without order conditions (i.e. 1 0 - > h ) the effect of productivity shocks,
labour supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks and changes in the risk premium
on the nominal exchange rate is uncertain.4
Let us briefly return to the money supply equation (14) and assume that we
are in a managed float with "leaning-against-the-wind". Using the feedback-rule
rather than the free float specification then implies that central banks can completely
insulate both nominal exchange rates and prices from relative money supply shocks
e
m
t  and money demand shocks e t
m by choosing  ( ) gm
s = - - 1 1 / l  and g
s
m =1.
However, in the face of asymmetric labour supply shocks e
w
t , productivity shocks
e t
z, demand shocks e
d
t  or speculative shocks e
y
t  the optimal policy response can
either insulate the nominal exchange rate or the price level ratio from these shocks,
                                               
4  The same feature arises in the model of  Clarida and Galí (1994).-    - 11
but never both. This is due to the fact that the real exchange rate component and the
relative price component of nominal exchange rates both depend on real shocks,




m. The trade-off between relative price stability and nominal exchange rate
stability has important implications for the long-run viability of a nominal exchange
rate peg: pegging to a country with a strongly asymmetric real economy may
ultimately erode competitiveness and depress output, and this in turn may spark
expectations of a future realignment aimed at reversing these real effects. In our
model, such expectations may be reflected by time-varying risk premia.
The flexible-price solution for the ex ante nominal interest rate differential it
can be obtained from (12) by carrying out the rational expectation projections of the
expected rate of exchange rate change based on the exchange rate equation above:

















Inserting this expression into the money demand equation yields the long-run
flexible-price solution for level of real money balances as:
( ) ( ) ( )

















































Real money balances rise in response to relative money demand shocks, whilst
money supply shocks have no long-run effect on real money balances. Furthermore,
real money balances increase in response to relative technology shocks and relative
labour supply shocks, whilst relative aggregate demand shocks reduce the demand
for real money balances. Also notice that without order conditions (i.e. 1 0 - > h )
the effect of an increase in the risk premium on relative real money balances is
uncertain.-    - 12
The dynamic response of our six key variables to the various shocks in the
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41 42 43 44
51 52 53 54 55
61 62 63 64 65 66
0 0 0 0 0





This matrix of "long-run" multipliers is lower triangular: only the price level and
hence also the exchange rate are driven by all six shocks, whilst relative
employment and output levels in the long run only respond to changes in risk
premia and supply shocks (labour supply and technology shocks), but not to
aggregate demand shocks or nominal shocks (money supply and money demand
shocks). These nominal shocks only drive nominal variables, such as the nominal
money, nominal interest rate differentials, the nominal exchange rate and the
relative price of output. Monetary shocks thereby have identical long-run effects on
the nominal exchange rate and relative prices (or wages), which in turn renders the
real exchange rate independent of such monetary shocks in the long run. This is not
true for shifts in favour of demand for domestic goods, which for a given relative
supply of goods and labour will result in a real depreciation if markets are to clear.
Finally, speculative changes in the risk premium have potential effects on all
variables in the system. Increases in risk premia work just like a bond market
imperfection: they reduce the availability of credit on domestic bond markets,
which impairs the ability of individuals to substitute between current and future
consumption and/or labour. As a result, individuals work and produce more when
compared to a situation in which home and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes.-    - 13
Under sluggish-price-adjustment, real quantities are demand rather than
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11 12 13 14 15 16
21 22 23 24 25 26
31 32 33 34 35 36
41 42 43 44 45 46
51 52 53 54 55 56
61 62 63 64 65 66
, (22)
This matrix of "short-run" multipliers displays no neutrality characteristics, and all
six variables are jointly driven by linear combinations of all six structural shocks.
2.2  Identifying fundamental and speculative shocks













































































where in order to allow for some dynamics we have replaced the matrix of short-run
multipliers by a matrix polynomial C(L), which is a function of the lag polynomials
in the various structural shocks. Our long-run identifying restrictions can now be
written in terms of the long-run multipliers, that is the sum C(1) of the elements of
C(L):
                                               
5 Since we do not employ short-run restrictions we do not derive this solution here. However, these
results are available from the author on request. See also Clarida and Gali for this feature of the
model.-    - 14
C( ) 1
0 0 0 0 0
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l l l l l
l l l l l l
. (24)
In the analysis below we will exclusively rely on these long-run identifying
restrictions implied by the flexible price solution of our model, and we restrict C(1)
to be lower block triangular.
3.  Empirical implementation and the structural VAR methodology
Following Galí (1992), the SVAR approach assumes that x=[x1,x2,x3,...,xk] is a
covariance stationary vector process. Each element in x has zero mean, or rather,
has been demeaned or detrended prior to estimation. Each element in x can be
expressed as a linear combination of current and past structural shocks e e=[e1,e2,e3,...,
ek]. Formally, x has a moving average representation, as described in equation (23),
and is given by:
x=C(L)e e. (25)
The reduced form Wold moving average representation is given by:
x=E(L)h h, (26)
where E(L)=[Eij(L)], E(0)=I, and E(L) is required to be invertible. The vector of
reduced form shocks h h=[h1,h2,h3,...,hk] is assumed to have a zero mean vector and a
variance covariance matrix W W. The corresponding reduced form autoregressive
representation in terms of the shocks h h is given by:
B(L)x=h h, (27)
with B(L)=[Bij(L)], B(L)=E(L)
-1, and B(0)=I, whilst the autoregressive




-1. The reduced form innovations h h are
now assumed to be a linear combination of the structural disturbances e e:
  h h=Se e. (29)
Given equations (25) and (26) this implies
  C(L)=E(L)S. (30)
Since OLS estimation of equation (27) yields estimates of B(L) and hence estimates
of its inverse, E(L)=B(L)
-1, the matrix C(L) can be uniquely identified to the extent
that we introduce enough restrictions to just-identify the matrix S.
How may such restrictions be derived? First, it is straightforward to assume
that the structural shocks e e are mutually orthogonal, which together with a
convenient normalization condition6 implies that E(e ee e')=I. Using this normalizing
condition together with equation (29) implies:
  SS'=W, (31)
and this factorization provides k(k+1)/2 non-linear restrictions on the elements in S,
given the OLS estimate of the variance-covariance matrix W of the reduced form
errors h h. This leaves us with the problem of determining the remaining k(k-1)/2
restrictions on the elements of S. Blanchard and Quah (1989) were the first to
propose identification of S in terms of long-run restrictions on the sum of the
polynomial lags in C(1). From equation (30) it follows that C(1)=E(1)S, and hence,
placing zero restrictions on the long-run impact C(1) of the structural shocks on x is
useful in identifying elements in S, given the estimate of E(1). Open economy
applications of such long-run restrictions to identify the real exchange rate effects of
                                               
6  This normalization ensures that the vector of shocks is measured in terms of one standard deviation of
the corresponding variable in the vector x-    - 16
various disturbances include Galí and Clarida (1994), Canzoneri, Vallés and Vinals
(1996) and Weber (1977).
4.  Empirical results for the European economies
In this section we represent our empirical results, with which we seek to
answer a number of questions: first, what are the sources of nominal exchange rate
movements since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and, in particular, do
currency crises appear to be driven by fundamental shocks or by speculative
shocks? If fundamentals matter, is it nominal or real shocks that play a major role?
Before presenting our results, we take a brief look at the time series properties of the
data.
4.1  Unit-root and cointegration properties of the data
In the econometric work we limit ourselves to seasonally-adjusted monthly
data beginning in 1971.VIII and ending in 1994.XII. Our starting date stems from
the beginning of the more freely floating exchange rate period, which can be dated
back to the closing of the gold window by the U.S. Federal Reserve in August 1971.
We make use of four-month lags in estimating the VARs, and our estimates cover
the years 1972.I through 1994.XII, or 276 observations. The data sources are
described in Appendix A of the paper.
We aim at estimating the system x=[Drt,Dlt,Dyt,Dst-Dpt,Dmt-Dpt,Dpt], whereby
the variables in x are defined as follows: Drt is the logarithm of the bilateral real
interest rate differential, defined as the difference of the nominal interest rate
differential Dit and the consumer price inflation differential Dpt, Drt=Dit-Dpt. The first
difference in the logarithm of the employment ratio is denoted by Dlt, Dyt is the first
difference in the logarithm of industrial production ratio, Dst-Dpt is the logarithm of
the bilateral real exchange rate, with Dst as the change in the nominal bilateral
exchange rate and Dpt as consumer price inflation, Finally, Dmt-Dpt corresponds to-    - 17
the change in real money balances, where Dmt is the change in the logarithm of the
ratio of the monetary base. By appropriate transformation these six variables also
uniquely determine the ratio of nominal money growth rates Dmt, the nominal
exchange rate Dst, nominal interest rate differentials Dit, and average labour
productivity Dyt-Dlt. The specification of the degree of time differencing and drift or
trend adjustment of the variables in x is based on prior unit root and cointegration
tests, which are briefly discussed below. 7
To identify the speculative component of currency crises we use real interest
rate differentials, calculated as the difference between nominal interest rate and
inflation differentials. As shown in Table 1, the ratios of price levels are integrated
of order one with a trend, I(1)+trend, and thus inflation differentials are I(0)+trend.
Nominal interest rate differentials were found to be I(1) for France, Italy, the United
Kingdom and the United States, whilst for the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark
I(0) processes were found. In our model both nominal and real interest rate
differentials have a unit root due to non-stationary risk premia, but in the data their
time series properties differ. Real interest rate differentials are found to be
I(0)+trend, and are dominated by large transitory inflation fluctuations. Since we are
interested in the permanent component of speculative shocks, we use the first
differences8 of real interest rate differentials in the VAR estimates. However, note
that our main results are not very sensitive with respect to this choice, except that
when we employ the level of real interest rate differentials we obtain a much more
erratic speculative component with large transitory fluctuations.
                                               
7 For details see also Weber (1994, 1997). Judgement is based on a variety of unit root tests, include
those of Dickey and Fuller (1981), Fuller (1976), Perron (1988), Phillips (1987), Phillips and Perron
(1988), Stock and Watson (1988), and Stock (1990). The complete set of unit-root and
cointegration test results is available on request.
8 Using first differences here implies no loss of long-run information because due to the stationarity
of real interest rate differentials cointegration is not an issue here.-    - 18
The time series properties of the endogenous variables employed in deriving
the five fundamental shocks are also analysed in Table 1. All bilateral output ratios
were found to be integrated of order one, I(1). The employment ratios were also in
general found to be I(1) with two exceptions: for France an I(1)+trend process
seems more appropriate, whilst for the United Kingdom there are indications of a
stationary employment ratio relative to Germany. The nominal exchange rates and
the above mentioned ratios of consumer price levels are both integrated of order one
with a trend, I(1)+trend. Real exchange rates are typically also I(1), which in turn
implies that relative price ratios and nominal exchange rates are not cointegrated.
This statement is supported by the formal evidence from bilateral cointegration tests
based on the procedure of Johansen and Juselius (1990). A similar statement applies
to the analysis of cointegration between the price ratios and nominal or real money
ratios in France, Italy, Belgium and the U.K., where again nominal money ratios
and price ratios are not found to be cointegrated. However, for the Netherlands,
Denmark and the United States there is some indication that the ratios of nominal
money balances relative to Germany are stationary, implying that real money ratios
and price ratios could be cointegrated. The formal cointegration tests in Table 2
suggest that for these three countries the cointegration rank is greater than zero
when a system containing all five fundamental variables is checked for
cointegration by using the procedure of Johansen and Juselius (1990). But if we
disregard either the price ratios or the real money balance ratios in the cointegration
tests we find no cointegration between the remaining four variables. The same is
true if we replace the price ratios by the nominal exchange rate and check for
cointegration in a system containing these five variables. To obtain estimates
compatible for all countries, we proceed by using exchange rates rather than price
ratios in estimating our unrestricted VAR. As pointed out above, this choice of x=[D
rt,Dlt,Dyt,Dst-Dpt,Dmt-Dpt,Dst] leaves our identification strategy unaltered, since we
impose no long-run identifying restrictions on exchange rates or price ratios.-    - 19
Because the ratios of all variables employed in identifying the fundamental
disturbances in our VAR were integrated of order one, we adjusted for drifts and
trends in the growth rates accordingly before estimating the unrestricted VAR using
a lag window of length four.9 In presenting the results we will first focus on the
impulse response functions of exchange rates to the various shocks and compare
them to the predictions of our theoretical model.
4.2  Impulse responses
Figure 1 displays the impulse responses of the bilateral nominal exchange
rates to a one-standard deviation disturbance for each type of shock. These signs of
the impulse responses are normalized such that a speculative shock has a significant
short-run and long-run positive effect on real interest rate differentials, relative
labour supply shocks significantly increase the employment ratio, productivity
shocks significantly boost the output ratio, money demand shocks significantly raise
relative real money balances and money supply shocks significantly increase the
price level ratio. The only exception is made with respect to the relative demand
shock, which we normalize such that like the supply shock it significantly increases
output on impact, but unlike the productivity shocks it has no long-run output
effects. How do these six shocks affect the six endogenous variables of our system
for each of the seven countries relative to Germany? Without going into detail
through the 252 (6*6*7) impulse response functions,10 the following main features
of the results should be pointed out: firstly, the estimates in Figure 1 suggest that
both relative money supply shocks and relative demand shocks are significantly
inflationary in the short-run and the long-run in all 7 countries. Productivity shocks
                                               
9 Our results were not very sensitive with respect to the length of the lag window. Similar results were
obtained by using alternative lag windows of length six or nine, but in these cases the impulse response
functions indicated a overparameterization of the VAR.
10 A detaled documentation of all impulse responses, variance decompositions and shock
components discussed in this paper are available from the author on request.-    - 20
and labour supply shocks have quite persistent and significantly deflationary effects
for the United Kingdom and the United States, whilst these shocks have no
significant short-run price effects for the ERM countries. But in most ERM
countries speculative shocks have significant short-run and, with the exception of
France, also long-run relative price effects, whilst for the United Kingdom and the
United States this is not the case. The reason for this asymmetry between ERM and
non-ERM countries becomes obvious from Figure 2: speculative shocks have quite
persistent and significant effects on ERM as opposed to non-ERM nominal
exchange rates, but real exchange rates move much less in response to such
speculative shocks. Notice that in Figure 2 the long-run depreciation in response to
speculative shocks is largest for Italy, followed by Belgium, Denmark, France and
the Netherlands. Another difference between ERM and non-ERM countries lies in
the effects of money supply shocks on nominal exchange rates: ERM exchange
rates display by far the largest and most significant impulse response to money
supply shocks. In the non-ERM countries the effects of relative demand shocks
dominate, and the impulse response to money supply shocks becomes insignificant
after 4-6 months. Interestingly, ERM exchange rates typically display an
overshooting-effect in response to money supply and speculative shocks. Also note
that for France and Italy relative supply shocks also have significant short-run and
long-run nominal exchange rate effects. This reflects the fact that between the three
large ERM countries business cycle asymmetries have been correlated with periods
of exchange market pressure (i.e. 1973-75, 1978-81).
To summarize, the estimated responses of the various endogenous variables to
our six structural shocks is quite consistent with the predictions from theory and at
first sight pass the duck test.11 We have identified important differences in the
propagation of speculative shocks and monetary policy shocks between the ERM
                                               
11 See Clarida and Galí (1995): "If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it must be .... "-    - 21
and more freely floating countries (U.K.,U.S.). All in all, our results suggest that
fundamentals matter more for ERM nominal exchange rates than for the floating
rates. Speculation is found to only have an impact on managed exchange rates, but
speculation is far from being the dominant factor. To understand European
exchange rate movements it is sufficient to look at few factors: loose monetary
policy relative to Germany plays the key role. For the larger European economies,
in particular for France, the nominal German mark exchange rates also appear to
respond significantly and consistently to relative supply shocks on goods and labour
markets. Thus, for intra-European exchange rates both fundamental and speculative
shock appear to matter.
4.3  Historical decompositions into shock components
Figures 3 and 4 display the components of German mark real exchange rates
due to the fundamental and speculative shocks. In the analysis we focus on the
shock components of the stochastic trend deviations of nominal exchange rates,
which are displayed in the second row of each figure. For the two large EMS
economies, France and Italy, the long-run trend in nominal exchange rates largely
reflects relative money supply shocks, which are the key determinant of inflation
differentials. The link between relative money supply shocks and exchange rate
movements is quite close during the post-1983 ERM period in France, but relatively
loose before this tightening of the EMS. Prior to the EMS-period, the French
nominal DM exchange rate shows a close co-movement with relative demand
shocks. The same is true for the other ERM countries, whereby the switch of
exchange rates from being driven by relative demand shocks to reflecting relative
monetary policy shocks occurs at various points in time. These dates appear to be
consistent with the estimated policy switch points for the tightening of the ERM
reported in Weber (1991). Also note that for the more freely floating economies, the
U.K. and the U.S., no such switch in the shock determinants of nominal exchange-    - 22
rates is found in Figure 4, and they are driven virtually one-to-one by relative
demand shocks. In Weber (1997) it is demonstrated that (in the absence of risk
premia) these relative demand shock basically reflect the non-monetary component
of real exchange rates which is not accounted for by relative supply shocks on
labour or product markets. But since monetary shocks by construction do not
explain long-run real exchange rates movements and supply shocks typically turn
out to be insignificant, these relative demand shocks may be viewed as a measure-
of- ignorance with respect to the sources of real exchange rate movements, as is
suggested in Weber (1997). For the more freely floating DM exchange rates, for
which both nominal and real exchange rates virtually move one-for-one, our
measure-of-ignorance with respect to the sources of exchange rate movements is
large. This interpretation matches the frequently reported stylized fact that nominal
U.S. dollar exchange rates are unpredictable with structural models and closely
resemble a random walk.12 For Europe, our results are different: we find quite
substantial labour supply shock and productivity shock components of real and
nominal exchange rates throughout the sample. This points towards a greater
business cycle transmission in Europe as compared to the United States, a result
which is consistent with the findings of Artis and Zhang (1995). Our results also
indicate the importance of the nominal exchange rate as a shock absorber with
respect to relative supply shocks in Europe. This is particularly obvious for the case
of the Netherlands, where nominal exchange rates relative to Germany moved little
by comparison with the other countries, but those small movements of the guilder
exchange rates almost exclusively reflect relative labour and product market
disturbances. Real fundamental supply side factors are also an important source of
nominal exchange rate movements in France, Italy and Belgium. The above
analysis therefore indicates that fundamentals matter more in Europe.
                                               
12 See for example Mussa (1979) or Isard (1995).-    - 23
But what about speculation? Figures 3 and 4 show that for the more freely
floating economies, the U.K. and the U.S., the speculative component of nominal
exchange rate movements is neglectable. Thus, as suggested by the currency crisis
literature, speculation appears to play no role for non-managed exchange rates. Our
results for the ERM economies are again drastically different: speculation against
the French franc appears to matter throughout the sample, and in particular in the
post-1981 period. Speculative shocks appear to be consistently one-sided, and there
is a substantial risk premium attached to the French franc. Interestingly, the
estimates of the speculative component of the French franc exchange rate
movements rises noticeably in mid 1992, shortly before the successful speculative
attacks on the lira and the pound sterling. The speculation pressure on the French
franc is quite persistent throughout the period up to the ERM collapse in August
1993. This finding is consistent with the results reported in Jeanne (1995), who also
finds strongly self-fulfilling speculation during France’s 1992-93 exchange-market
travails.13 One-sided speculation is also found for the Italian lira, the Belgian franc
and the Danish krona (not reported in the graphs), and in each case speculative
pressure contributes to a devaluation of these currencies relative to the German
mark. Finally, except for the French franc the time pattern of the speculative shock
suggests that the European currency crises of 1992/93 could not be predicted on the
basis of unusually high risk premia attached to these currencies prior to the attacks.
The self-fulfilling aspects of the speculative attacks of 1992/93 were clearly second
order when compared to their fundamental components: throughout the EMS higher
money growth and inflationary monetary policy shocks outside Germany were the
main force behind long-run nominal exchange rate movements. These results are
consistent with the empirical findings of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995a,
                                               
13 On this point see also Rose and Svensson (1994) and Obstfeld (1996).-    - 24
1995b), who found that fundamental monetary, real or fiscal imbalances typically
precede speculative attacks.
5.  Summary
Two generations of currency crisis models co-exist in the literature: first
generation models predict co-movements between speculative attacks and adverse
movements in the fundamental determinants of exchange rates, whilst in second
generation models speculative attacks may be purely self-propagating and
potentially self-fulfilling. Given these opposing views, which is the empirically
more relevant model? The present paper has tried to deal with this issue by
developing and estimating a model in which the exchange rate is driven by various
fundamental factors, but also has a speculative component.
We found that exchange rate fundamentals matter in Europe. To understand
European exchange rate movements it is sufficient to look at few factors only: loose
monetary policy relative to Germany plays the key role. For the larger European
economies, in particular for France and Italy, the nominal German mark exchange
rates also appear to respond significantly and consistently to relative supply shocks
on goods and labour markets. This reflects the fact that between the three large
ERM countries business cycle asymmetries have been correlated with periods of
exchange market pressure. But speculation matters too during currency crises. In all
ERM countries nominal exchange rates move significantly in response to
speculative shocks, in particular in the short run (4-8 months horizon). The long-run
response of exchange rates to speculative shocks is largest for Italy, followed by
Belgium, Denmark, France and smallest for the Netherlands. The size of the
speculative components of exchange rate movements also varies greatly in Europe.
Speculative shocks appear to be consistently one-sided. We find a substantial risk
premium attached to the French franc before the 1992 crisis, and speculation
pressure on the French franc remains high thereafter, which reveals a strongly self--    - 25
fulfilling aspect of France’s 1992-93 exchange rate crisis. One-sided speculative
components of exchange rate movements are also found for the Italian lira, the
Belgian franc and the Danish krona, and in each case speculative pressure
contributes to a devaluation of these currencies relative to the German mark. But
our results also establish that the European currency crises of 1992/93 could not be
predicted on the basis of unusually high risk premia attached to these currencies
prior to the attacks. Except perhaps for the French franc, the self-fulfilling aspects
of the speculative attacks of 1992/93 were clearly second order when compared to
their fundamental components. These results are consistent with the empirical
findings of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995a, 1995b), who discover that
fundamental monetary, real or fiscal imbalances typically precede speculative
attacks. But not all currency crises are alike. We found that both the direction and
the timing of the attack on the French franc can be better understood by referring to
it’s substantial speculative component. This is not the case for the other ERM
currencies.
Where do we go from here? Future empirical research on currency crises
should focus on the timing of the speculative attacks, which has been a key issue
during the 1992/93 ERM crises. The fundamental and speculative components of
currency crisis identified here did not suggest any particular reason why these
attacks occurred when they occurred. In theoretical models of currency crises this
issue is typically pinned down by incorporating deviations of the stock of central
bank foreign exchange reserves from some minimal threshold into the model.
Foreign exchange reserves were disregarded here because the focus of the present
paper was on discriminating between the fundamental and speculative components
of currency crises, but incorporating this aspect is the obvious next step. A second
important field of future research would be to establish the robustness of our results
by applying the SVAR approach advocated here to other currency crises, such as
the Mexican peso crisis.-    - 26
Appendix: Time series and data sources
All data are monthly, seasonally adjusted data. In case the original data were
not seasonally adjusted, seasonal adjustment was carried out using the GAUSSX
procedure SAMA. The time series and data sources used are listed below.
Output (industrial production index): International Monetary Fund (IMF),
International Financial Statistics (IFS), line 66c; employment: inverse of the
number of registered unemployed, longest time series available from either the
Commission of the European Economies (EC), Cronos-Database, or the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Main
Economic Indicators (MEI); consumer price indices: IMF, IFS; monetary base
(M0), IMF, IFS; line 14, national definition for the United Kingdom; nominal
exchange rates IMF, IFS, line ae; nominal interest rates (call money rates):
longest time series available from either IMF, IFS, line60b, or OECD, MEI;-    - 27
Appendix B: Solving the model under short-run sluggish prices
The short-run sluggish-price-adjustment solution of our model may be derived
by viewing quantities as being demand rather than supply determined. By
substituting (19) into the price setting rule (10) and carrying out the conditional
expectations projection, we derive that the ratio of home to foreign price levels, pt ,
is given by:
( ) ( ) [ ]
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As in the long-run flexible-price solution, the ratio of the price levels in the short-
run sluggish-price-adjustment solution is a function of all six shocks. In response to
a money supply or aggregate demand shock the price level rises in the short-run, but
by less than in the long-run. The same holds under the order condition from above
( ) l jb b g > +  for speculative increases in the risk premium. Finally, the price
level falls in the sticky-price solution as a result of money demand, aggregate
supply or labour supply shocks, again by less than in the flexible-price solution. The
degree of "sluggishness" is thereby indexed by (1-q).
The real exchange rate solution under partial price adjustment may be
obtained by substituting (1) and (12) into (11) and using (B1) to obtain:
( )( )( )
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An interesting feature of this solution is that both money supply and money demand
shocks influence the real exchange rate in the sticky-price solution, whilst in the
flexible-price solution they do not. Furthermore, in the flexible-price solution
monetary shocks had an identical impact on both the price level and the nominal
exchange, but in the sluggish-price-adjustment solution for the nominal exchange
rate:-    - 28
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the famous Dornbusch (1976) "overshooting-effect" in response to money supply
shocks (e
m
t ) can be generated for  ( ) ( ) 1 0 - - + - > s h b g jf . Note that this order
condition also implies a short-run overshooting-effect of the exchange rate in
response to speculative increases in the risk premium (e
y
t ), as well as an




t ) and productivity shocks (e t
z).
Using (B2) and the IS equation (1) to solve for the demand-determined level
of output under sluggish price adjustment results in:
( )( )( )( ) [ ]
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whilst using (A1) and the labour demand equation (8) to solve for the demand-
determined relative employment level under sluggish price adjustment yields:
( )( )
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Both the output ratio and the employment ratio are now functions of all five shocks,
and not only of technology or labour supply shocks. Home relative to foreign output
and employment only partially rises in response to technology and labour supply
shocks under the short-run sticky-price solution. Furthermore, relative money
supply and aggregate demand shocks boost home relative to foreign output and
employment in the "short-run" under partial price adjustment, whilst relative money
demand shocks depress the output and employment ratios temporarily under
sluggish price adjustment.
Finally, using (20) and (21) to solve for the demand-determined level of
nominal interest rate differentials results in:-    - 29
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which together with (12) and (B1) yields the short-run solution for the real interest
rate:
( )( )( )
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Notice that whilst under the above order condition  ( ) ( ) 1 0 - - + - > s h b g jf
nominal exchange rates and nominal interest rate differentials display the famous
Dornbusch (1976) "overshooting-effect" in response to money supply shocks (e
m
t )
and speculative increases in the risk premium (e
y
t ), real exchange rates and real
interest rate differentials always adjust gradually towards long-run equilibrium. Our
model therefore captures quite well the high volatility of nominal financial return
during periods of speculative attacks. The model also clearly shows that financial
volatility is not necessarily the result of large transitory shocks; on the contrary, it
may equally well arise as a result of an overreaction of financial markets to small
but permanent shocks.
Finally, using the above interest rate differential equation in (11) jointly with
(B3) yields the demand determined level of real money balances:
( ) ( ) [ ]
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which again is a function of all six shocks and displays gradual adjustment towards
equilibrium.
The dynamic response of our six key variables to the various shocks in the
"short-run" sluggish-price-adjustment solution can be summarized in matrix
notation as equation (22) in the main text.-    - 30
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Figure 1: Nominal Exchange Rates and Price Ratios for the United
States versus Germany, 1972-1996
Key to Figure: _____ Log of Real Exchange Rate  - - - - -  Log of Price Level Ratio-    - 35
Figure 2: Nominal Exchange Rates and Price Ratios of European
Economies versus the United States and Germany, 1972-1996
(a) France-USA      (e) France-Germany
     
(b) Italy-USA         (f) Italy-Germany
     
(c) Belgium-USA         (g) Belgium-Germany
      
(d) United Kingdom-USA         (h) United Kingdom-Germany
     -    - 36
Key to Figure: _______ Log of Nominal Exchange Rate  - - - - - - Log of Price
Ratio-    - 37
Figure 3:  Impulse Response of the Price Ratios of EC-Countries and the United States Relative to





























Germany-    - 38
Key:  The solid lines are the mean response of the ratio of log level of the consumer price ratios to a one standard deviation shock. The
dashed lines are the 2 standard error bands obtained by Monte Carlo simulation.-    - 39
Figure 4:  Impulse Response of the Nominal DM Exchange Rates of EC-Countries  and the United States





























Germany-    - 40
Key:  The solid lines are the mean response of the ratio of log level of the exchange rate to a one standard deviation shock. The dashed
lines are the 2 standard error bands obtained by Monte Carlo simulation.-    - 41
Figure 5: Shock Components of the Nominal DM Exchange Rates
of EC-Countries, Monthly Data, 1972.I-1994.XII























Key:  To indicate the proportion of exchange rate movements due to the various
shock components they are dispayed together with the stochastic trend deviations of
the exchange rate (dashed lines).-    - 42
Figure 6: Shock Components of the Nominal DM Exchange
Rates of EC and Non-EC Countries, Monthly Data, 1972.I-
1994.XII






















Shock-    - 43
Key:  To indicate the proportion of exchange rate movements due to the various
shock components they are dispayed together with the stochastic trend deviations of
the exchange rate (dashed lines)-    - 44
Table 1: Summary of Unit Root Test Statistics for the Key Macroeconomic Variables in all Bilateral
Relationships of EC-Countries and the United States Relative to Germany
Country
Variable
France Italy Netherlands Belgium Denmark UK United States
Employment
Ratio
















I(1)+drift I(1) I(1)+drift I(1)+drift I(1) I(1)+drift I(1)
Price Level
Ratio
I(1)+trend I(1)+trend I(1)+trend I(1)+trend I(1)+trend I(1)+trend I(1)+drift
Nominal Ex-
change Rate
I(1)+trend I(1)+trend I(1) I(1)+trend I(1)+trend I(1) I(1)
Real Ex-
change Rate








I(0)+trend I(0)+trend I(0)+trend I(0)+trend I(0)+trend I(0)+trend I(0)
or I(1)
Key: Own calculations using GAUSS386. The unit root properties indicated here are based on the test statistics and decision process
outlined in Weber (1977) for the United States versus Germany. The full set of tables with the detailed results is available on request.-    - 45
Table 2: Cointegration Test Statistics for the Key Macroeconomic Variables in the Bilateral
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None Employment (l), Output (y),
Real Exchange Rate (q), Real
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None Employment (l), Output (y),
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None Employment (l), Output (y),
Real Exchange Rate (q),















None Output (y), Real Exchange
Rate (q), Real Money (m-p),
Prices (p)
Key: Cointegration analysis was carried out using EVIEWS